



Risk Based Security

Automotive Safety & Security, 30. Mai 2017

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Agenda


► **Motivation**

Risk-based approach to Cybersecurity


Conclusion

The Challenge of Increasing Functionality


- ▶ Increasing number and complexity of functions
- ▶ More and more distributed development
- ▶ Rising safety, security and network requirements



Connectivity + Complexity = Cyber Attacks



Many different *attack vectors* to be regarded



Why do we need to care about Cybersecurity

Functional Safety




- ▶ Goal: Protect health
- ▶ Risk: Accident
- ▶ Governance: ISO 26262
- ▶ Methods:
 - ▶ HARA, FTA, FMEA, ...
 - ▶ Fail operational, ...
 - ▶ Redundancy, ...

Cyber Security




- ▶ Goal: Protect assets
- ▶ Risk: Attack, exploits
- ▶ Governance: ISO 27001 etc.
- ▶ Methods:
 - ▶ TARA, ...
 - ▶ Cryptography, IDIP, ...
 - ▶ Key management, ...

Privacy



- ▶ Goal: Protect personal data
- ▶ Risk: Data breach
- ▶ Governance: Privacy laws
- ▶ Methods:
 - ▶ TARA,...
 - ▶ Cryptography,...
 - ▶ Explicit consent, ...

Feature Example: Experiences from developer's daily life ...



Function	Hazard	S/E/C	ASIL
Passive Entry	After starting from standstill a nearby second key opens the car from remote by accident. Doors are unlocked and opened unintentionally. Car could open and hit pedestrian on low speed.	S2/E3/C1	QM
Steering Column Lock	During driving on high speed (Highway) steering column is locked and vehicle crashes in safety fence	S3/E4/C3	D
Steering Column Lock	... Person nearby is locking steering column from remote whereby the vehicle is on medium speed.	S3/??/C3	??

Functional safety methods do not cover security issues. An automotive standard is missing.

Different Threats Demand Holistic Systems Engineering

Functional Safety



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Cyber Security



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Liability → Risk management → Holistic systems engineering

Agenda


Motivation

▶ **Risk-based approach to Cybersecurity**

Conclusion


Functional safety & Cyber security – Risk based approach

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Severity of harmful event} \times \text{Probability of occurrence}$$




The purpose of development measures is to **reduce the residual risk** (caused by new features) to an acceptable level.

Concept of *Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA)*



General automotive asset categories



Example: Identified threats

- ▶ **Safety**
 - 1 Injuries because of malfunctioning Passive Entry
- ▶ **Financial**
 - 2 Loss of annual sales due to damage to brand image
- ▶ **Operational Performance**
 - Doors locked
- ▶ **Privacy / Legislation**
 - 3 Theft of private data

Security considers a larger scope of threats compared with **Safety**.

Detailed Steps for TARA






Asset/Function	Security Attack	Threat	Risk
Asset 1	Attack-type 1	Threat 1	EAL (Evaluation Assurance Levels)
Function 1	Attack-type 2	Threat 2	ASIL
...

Asset/Function	Attack	Threat	Threat-Level (e.g. Expertise, Equipment)	Impact-Level (e.g. Financial, Privacy, Safety)	Risk level
Passive entry	Authenticity: Attacker unlocks the vehicle doors.	Vehicle doors are unlocked and vehicle is stolen.	High	High 3	Medium
	Authenticity: Attacker unlocks the vehicle doors.	Vehicle doors are opened at high speed. Vehicle crashes into opposing traffic.	Very High	Very High 1	Very High
	Authenticity: Attacker unlocks the doors of many vehicles.	Vehicle doors are unlocked and many vehicles are stolen.	Medium	Very High 2 3	High

TARA Tool from *Real World*





CIAAG
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Authenticity, Governance


Resulting Security Goals
Maximum
(Safety, Financial)



No.	Variant	Asset ID	Asset / Vehicle Function	CIA	Threat ID	Hazard / Threat	Expertise	Window of Opportunity	Knowledge	Equipment	Threat level	Safety	Financial	Operational	Privacy	Impact Level	Security level	SG ID	Security Goal
1	Platform (TBC)	Ast 2	Braking to prevent collision	A	Tht-1	Driver crashes into preceding car. Passengers in both cars are severely wounded or killed.	Expert	Medium	Sensitive	Bespokes	Low	Life-threatening or fatal injuries	Low	High	No impact	Critical	Medium	SG1	If requested the brakes shall be activated
2	Platform (TBC)	Ast 2	Braking to prevent collision	I	Tht-2	Braking although not authorized, e.g. > 10 km/h	Expert	Medium	Sensitive	Bespokes	Low	Severe and life threatening injuries	High	High	No impact	Critical	High	SG2	Unauthorized braking shall be avoided.
3	Platform (TBC)	Ast 1	IPR of functions	C	Tht-3	RCTA function becomes public knowledge	Expert	High	Public	Bespokes	Medium	No injuries	High	No impact	No impact	Critical	High	SG3	RCTA function shall remain secret.

Security Architecture Design



Security Architecture Design



- ▶ Peer Reviews
- ▶ **Attack Trees** as System Vulnerability Analysis

Derive Appropriate Security Mechanisms

	Prevent	Detect	Forensic
Critical	++	++	++
High	+	++	++
Medium	+	+	++
Low	(+)	+	+
QM	O	O	+

O: No recommendation for or against approach

+: Approach is recommended for security level

++: Approach is highly recommended for security level

Examples

- ▶ Network/process/ information separation
- ▶ Encryption, digital signatures
- ▶ Key management
- ▶ Access control
- ▶ Firewall
- ▶ Intrusion prevention systems


Examples

- ▶ Intrusion detection systems (IDS)
- ▶ Monitoring

Examples

- ▶ Logging
- ▶ Security issue knowledge base
- ▶ Analysis and investigation of digital evidence

Security Engineering




Implement Security by Design: Verification and Validation

► Tools

- Static / dynamic code analyzer
- Encryption cracker
- Vulnerability scanner
- Network traffic analyzer / stress tester
- Hardware debugger
- Interface scanner
- Exploit tester
- Layered fuzzing tester


► Life Hacking

- Penetration testing
- Attack schemes
- Governance and social engineering attacks




Test for the known – and for the unknown.
Ensure automatic regression tests are running with each delivery.

Security By Design: What will happen to *After Sales Services*?



Major difference between security & safety: Risk-management during vehicle lifetime.

Game Changer: Deploy Security for Service & Operations: OTA



Over the Air (OTA) Update: This feature opens the gate for a big number of threats and is a solution at same time.

Agenda

Motivation

Risk-based approach to Cybersecurity

▶ **Conclusion**

Automotive Cyber Security

- ▶ **Security demands a thorough culture change**
 - ▶ Advance a cyber security culture across functions
 - ▶ Enforce strong governance end-to-end, not just encryption and key management


- ▶ **Risk based security is the order of the day**
 - ▶ Apply systems engineering for safety and cyber security
 - ▶ Systematically use professional tools such as Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment (TARA), vulnerability analysis, secure by design methods, hacking invitations, and various penetration testing
 - ▶ Close known vulnerabilities as soon as possible (→ OTA)
 - ▶ Audit your suppliers and achieve a holistic perspective on risks and solutions

It needs the ability to think like a **Criminal**
and preemptively act as an **Engineer**

Vector Cyber Security is Defined by Three Levers


Digitization

Automotive and IT industries increasingly converge. Software and IT are the major market driver in automotive. IT departments and automotive E/E must collaborate.



Attacks

Critical systems are by definition insecure. A 100% security solution is not possible. Advanced risk assessment and mitigation is the order of the day.



Governance

Abuse, misuse and confuse cases will make it to the headlines. Especially if safety and privacy are impacted. Systematic security engineering needs a thorough culture change.

Vector proposition:

- ▶ Bridging best practices from IT and engineering
- ▶ Holistic systems Engineering for Security and Safety

Vector proposition:

- ▶ Risk based security assessment and engineering
- ▶ AUTOSAR software, HW based security, engineering services

Vector proposition:

- ▶ Security culture: Competences, organization, process
- ▶ Secure by design: Infrastructures, methods, tools

Vector Cyber Security Portfolio

Security Solutions

- ▶ **Consulting**
Vector Security Check, Security Engineering, ...
- ▶ **Software**
AUTOSAR, Re-programming ECUs, OTA, Smart Charging...
- ▶ **Tools**
Test, Diagnosis, ...
- ▶ www.vector.com/security

Trainings and media

- ▶ Training "Automotive Cyber Security"
Stuttgart, Tue. 5. Jul. 2016
www.vector.com/training-security
- ▶ In-house trainings tailored to
your needs available worldwide
- ▶ Free white papers...
www.vector.com/media-security





Questions?



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For more information please contact us.

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